F. Vessel permit data. Though vessel-level catch or crew data cannot be obtained, annual federal vessel permit data is publicly available from the Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office from 1994-2017 (6) . The data includes permit number, address, home port, and principal port and can be used to address labor leakage (SI Appendix, section 5). Table S7 shows that the cumulative effect of NAO on reduced employment in fishing is monotonically increasing over time (see the linear combination of NAO effects in Table S7 ). This pattern matches the monotonically increasing cumulative effects of NAO on catch and revenue over time (see the linear combination of NAO effects in Fig. 2 and Table S3 and Table S5 ). This could be driven be a decrease in labor demand as the reduction in catch propagates through different fisheries according to their age-structure (Table S1 ). The linear combination of NAO in Tables S8 and S9 also show cumulative effects monotonically increasing for wages and establishments. Equation 3 assumes linearity between the log of fishing employment and lags of NAO. I test to see if a linear relationship holds by plotting the residuals of a lag of NAO on the remaining lags of NAO against the residuals of log of fishing employment on the same remaining lags of NAO. Figure S1 shows that the linearity assumption is not overly restrictive. The linear relationship implies that we can linearly combine lagged NAO coefficients to get the cumulative effect of NAO described in the above section.
Monotonic increase

Checking for linearity
Checking for time-varying effects
A rolling-window analysis is used to statistically test for time-varying effects of NAO on fishing revenue and employment in New England. Figure S2 , panel a shows the effect of NAO on employment over time. Each black point plots the coefficient of β from Eq. 3 with whiskers showing a 95% confidence interval from a 20-year estimation window. The points are plotted on the mean year of the estimation window. Errors are clustered by county to flexibly account for within-county, across-time correlation. Panel b shows the effect of NAO on fishing revenue, δ from Eq. 1 using a 20-year estimation window. Again, points are plotted on the mean year of the estimation window. Red lines show the 95% confidence interval of the full sample in both panels for fishing employment and 1971-2017 for fishing revenue). Significance is lost due to the short panel and being underpowered. Both plots show no linear trend. There may be a non-trending, low-frequency oscillatory signal in panel b, but its mean is captured by the full sample and all the moving window estimates' confidence intervals lie within the full sample's confidence interval, except for one point in panel b that estimates a larger effect than the full sample estimate.
No evidence of labor leakage
To address concerns that labor may move out of New England and into adjacent regions, I use a "donut-hole" regression and omit the Mid-Atlantic. To address concerns that New England fishermen are fishing or landing in the South Atlantic, I use federal commercial permit data (SI 1F) to compare the home state of a vessel permit holder to the home port and principal port of their vessel for every year from 1994 to 2017. The number of vessels that came from New England but have either home ports or principal ports in the South Atlantic represent 0.1% of permits from 1994-2017. The number of vessels that land or moor in New England from the South Atlantic are 2% over the entire time period, showing almost zero movement between the two regions for large commercial fishing operations. I also look for NAO impacts on the overall labor force in fishing counties. The size of the overall labor force appears to be correlated with NAO, but when I add a regional time trend, this effect goes away S12. This implies that, on average, NAO most likely has no impact on the New England counties used in this analysis, but if it did, it would be increasing the labor force in New England compared to the South Atlantic. Similarly, the number of individuals employed appear to be positively correlated with NAO, but not when linear regional trends are added (Table S12 ).
Taken together, these two analyses show no evidence of movement between the two regions that correlates with NAO.
Management
The primary fishery management tool used by the New England Fishery Management Council is an output effort control in the form of total allowable catch. This is the maximum annual catch that is allowed to be caught of a particular fish stock. Total allowable catch (TAC) was gathered for New England stocks ‡ from the Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office (7) and the Federal Register for 1997-2017. Earlier in the time series, TACs were target TACs for some fisheries and were not enforced. This practice ended in 2010, which coincided with adoption of the Sector Program or catch shares programs in New England. An indicator variable for post-catch-share implementation was added to the main analysis to reflect this change and did not alter results (Tables S16 -S21 ). more complex due to the high number of fishers who fish under state management. Active number of licenses and traps by year was the most consistent dataset that was found for 1981-2013 (9) . The last addendum that changed trap limits or allocations was in 2013 (10) and in practice trap reductions can be offset by adjusting set-over days to maintain trap hauls per day. All main results on employment were also run during the 1996-2017 time period that matches most of the management data (column 9 in Tables S7-S9, Table S13 , S15, S17, S19, S21, S30 and column 7 in Tables S22-S28 ). Figure S3 shows there is little significant correlation between lags of NAO and management, except for a slight increase in the number of active lobster licenses two years after an increase in the NAO index and a slight increase in Sea Scallop quotas 3 years after an increase in the NAO index. This signal is in the opposite direction of the NAO impacts on catch and employment, where management allows fishing effort to increase a couple of years after a positive NAO event. If these small effects have any influence on the impact of NAO on employment, they would downwardly bias or attenuate the magnitude of the results on those NAO lags. In other words, the main results might underestimate the impact of NAO on catch or employment (SI 5).
The cumulative effect of NAO on labor from 1996 to 2017
Since the impacts of NAO on labor are cumulative, it is important to understand the impacts of NAO over time for interpretation. I conducted a hindcasting exercise following Meng et al. (3) where I built a hindcast with observed NAO events and a hindcast that assumed every year in the time period was exposed to a neutral NAO event where the index equals zero. I then took the difference between the two hindcasts to attribute changes in employment to NAO. I did this for the 1996-2017 period because it is after the passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act and matches the time range of the management data. The impacts of NAO can be decomposed by:
1. Estimate employment with p = 6 using the full data sample:
Predict employment without NAO using only regional time trends, year and county fixed effects for the period 1996-2017:
3. Predict employment with NAO, regional time trends, year and county fixed effects for the period 1996-2017:
To get the percentage contribution in the overall employment decline due to the NAO t ∈ [s1, s2]:
where s1 and s2 are three year averages at the beginning and end of the 1996-2017 time period.
NAO effects on county-level fishing employment
By interacting county dummies with the second term of Eq. 3, county-level effects of NAO on employment can be estimated. Only a few counties were dropped due to collinearity. The beta coefficient is shown and can be interpreted as the percentage of employment loss due to a one-unit increase in the NAO index from the climatic mean. Orange are negative coefficients and green are positive coefficients. Each panel represents the effect of NAO on employment using a different lag of NAO. L1 represents one lag, L2 two lags and so on. Most counties have noisy estimates due to being underpowered. Horizontal black lines indicate no statistical significance. In some instances, one county may show no statistical significance with one lag, gain significance in another lag and then show it in the opposite direction in yet another lag. However, there are indications that Maine and more northern parts of New England are less climate resilient compared to the more southern part of New England. More data will be needed to solidify these spatial patterns as well as understand the heterogeneous drivers. Plots the residuals of a lag of NAO on remaining lags of NAO against the residuals of the inverse hyperbolic sine of fishing employment on the same remaining lags of NAO (blue dots). These residuals are fitted with a lowess curve (light blue line). Each panel plots these residuals for one lag of NAO. Lags go from 1 to 6, left to right and top to bottom. Regression coefficients shown from multiple regressions of total South Atlantic catch on current and past NAO and a 5th-order polynomial time trend using Eq. 1 with Newey-West robust standard errors with optimal bandwidth. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table S5. Effects of NAO on total revenue in New England
Dep. var. is log total revenue
NAOt -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.013** -0.012** -0.017** -0.014*** (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0039) NAOt−1 -0.018* -0.016* -0.019** -0.020** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.023*** (0.0086) -70.0 -67.6 Notes: Regression coefficients shown from multiple regressions of total New England revenue on current and past NAO and a 5th-order polynomial time trend using Eq. 1 with Newey-West robust standard errors with optimal bandwidth. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table S6. Effects of NAO on total revenue in South Atlantic
Dep. var. is log total revenue -44.7 -41.5 -37.5 -37.6 Notes: Regression coefficients shown from multiple regressions of total South Atlantic revenue on current and past NAO and a 5th-order polynomial time trend using Eq. 1 with Newey-West robust standard errors with optimal bandwidth. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table S7. Difference in differences: Effects of NAO on employment in fishing
Dep. var. is log employment in fishing 1 Notes: Effect of current and past NAO on employment in fishing for counties affected by NAO (New England) relative to counties not affected by NAO (South Atlantic). Regression coefficients shown from multiple regressions using Eq. 3 of fishing employment by county on lagged NAO events. Preferred specification is column 6. Column 8 uses incomplete sub-industry data from 1984-2017 that has several limitations (SI A). Column 9 uses the same data as columns 1-7, but for 1996-2017, consistent with the management data (SI 6). Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table S8. Difference in differences: Effects of NAO on wages in fishing
Dep. var. is log wages in fishing Notes: Effect of current and past NAO on wages in fishing for counties affected by NAO (New England) relative to counties not affected by NAO (South Atlantic). Regression coefficients shown from multiple regressions using Eq. 3 of fishing wages by county on lagged NAO events. Preferred specification is column 6. Column 8 uses incomplete sub-industry data from 1984-2017 that has several limitations (SI A). Column 9 uses the same data as columns 1-7, but for 1996-2017, consistent with the management data (SI 6). Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table S9. Difference in differences: Effects of NAO on establishments in fishing
Dep. var. is log establishments in fishing
NAOt -0.044** -0.047** -0.046** -0.050** -0.047** -0.077** -0.075*** -0.050 Notes: Effect of current and past NAO on establishments in fishing for counties affected by NAO (New England) relative to counties not affected by NAO (South Atlantic). Regression coefficients shown from multiple regressions using Eq. 3 of fishing establishments by county on lagged NAO events. Preferred specification is column 6. Column 8 uses incomplete sub-industry data from 1984-2017 that has several limitations (SI A). Column 9 uses the same data as columns 1-7, but for 1996-2017, consistent with the management data (SI 6). Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 . Each regression includes county and year fixed effects, but only columns 2, 4, and 5 include regional time trends, and columns 3 and 4 include an indicator for post-multispecies and sea-scallop catch-share implementation. Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Each regression includes county and year fixed effects, but only columns 2, 4, and 5 include regional time trends, and columns 3 and 4 include an indicator for post-multispecies and sea-scallop catch-share implementation. Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Table S20 . Fishing establishments results: Robustness to regional characteristics (1990-2017)
Dep. var. is log fishing establishments 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 AIC 2116.9 2115.2 2091.7 2083.4 2115.2 Notes: Effect of current and past NAO on fishing establishments for counties affected by NAO (New England) relative to counties not affected by NAO (South Atlantic). Each regression includes county and year fixed effects, but only columns 2, 4, and 5 include regional time trends, and columns 3 and 4 include an indicator for post-multi-species and sea-scallop catch-share implementation. Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Table S21 . Fishing establishment results: Robustness to regional characteristics (1996-2017)
Dep. var. is log fishing establishments . Each regression includes county and year fixed effects, but only columns 2, 4, and 5 include regional time trends, and columns 3 and 4 include an indicator for post-multispecies and sea-scallop catch-share implementation. Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 6196.0 Notes: Effect of current and past NAO on employment in finance and insurance for fishing counties affected by NAO (New England) relative to fishing counties not affected by NAO (South Atlantic). Each regression includes current and past NAO events as well as county fixed effects and year fixed effects using Eq. 3. Column 7 shows results for sub-sample, 1996-2017, which is consistent with the management data (SI 6). Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Effect of current and past NAO on employment in tour operators for fishing counties affected by NAO (New England) relative to fishing counties not affected by NAO (South Atlantic). Each regression includes current and past NAO events as well as county fixed effects and year fixed effects using Eq. 3. Column 7 shows results for sub-sample, 1996-2017, which is consistent with the management data (SI 6). Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 Notes: Effect of current and past NAO on employment in extraction for fishing counties affected by NAO (New England) relative to fishing counties not affected by NAO (South Atlantic). Regression coefficients shown from multiple regression models using Eq. 3 of extraction employment by county on lagged NAO events. Each regression includes current and past NAO events as well as county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column 7 shows extraction employment in levels and column 8 shows the effect for all extraction counties (not just fishing counties). Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Kimberly L. Oremus Notes: Effect of current and past NAO on employment in extraction for fishing counties affected by NAO (New England) relative to fishing counties not affected by NAO (South Atlantic). Regression coefficients shown from multiple regression models using Eq. 3 of employment in extraction by county on lagged NAO events. Each regression includes current and past NAO events as well as county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column 7 shows extraction employment in levels and column 8 shows the effect for all extraction counties (not just fishing counties). Errors were clustered at the county level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
